IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI WESTERN DIVISION

IN RE: T-MOBILE CUSTOMER DATA SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION,	)	MDL No. 3019
	)	Master Case No. 4:21-MD-03019-BCW
ALL ACTIONS	)	

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE OBJECTION OF CASSIE HAMPE AND TO REVOKE ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Objection of Cassie Hampe and to Revoke Admission Pro Hac Vice of Robert Clore and Mikell West. (Doc. #208). The Court, being duly advised of the premises, having considered the parties' briefs and having heard argument as to Hampe's objection and as to the motion to strike, grants said motion.

On December 8, 2022, Cassie Hampe submitted an objection to the Settlement through her lawyers at the Bandas Firm, Robert W. Clore and Mikell A. West. (Doc. #189). After deposing Ms. Hampe, Plaintiffs moved to strike the objection and to revoke the admission pro hac vice of Mr. Clore and Mr. West. (Doc. #208). In the motion to strike currently before this Court, Plaintiffs assert that the Bandas Firm and its principal, Christopher A. Bandas, along with others acting on its behalf, including Mr. Clore and Mr. West, are serial objectors with a history of pursuing objections to class settlements for improper purposes and personal benefit. Plaintiffs also contend the Bandas Firm has repeatedly filed objections on behalf of either Cassie Hampe or her husband Clark Hampe, who is Christopher Bandas' brother. Plaintiffs argue that "Cassie Hampe's objection here carries on the Bandas/Hampe pattern of filing bad faith objections and delaying settlement

payments to class members through appeals while seeking to extract a payment for their illicit family enterprise." (Doc. # 208 at 1).[1]

A. Bandas Firm's History of Objections to Class Settlements

As Plaintiffs argued during the final approval hearing, the Court has reason to be skeptical of the Bandas Firm's longstanding practice of filing serial objections that courts have repeatedly found are not in the best interests of settlement classes. Before approving a Rule 23 class settlement and entering a judgment, it is this Court's obligation to consider the information before it, including the opinions of class members, in determining whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. However, some objections are "made for improper purposes, and benefit only the objectors and their attorneys (e.g., by seeking additional compensation to withdraw even ill-founded objections)." Manual for Complex Litig. § 21.643 (4th ed.). "An objection, even of little merit, can be costly and significantly delay implementation of a class settlement." Id.; see also In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., MDL No. 2800, 2020 WL 256132, at *41 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2020) ("Objectors can play a useful role in the court's evaluation of the proposed settlement terms. They might, however, have interests and motivations vastly different from other attorneys and parties."). As courts have recognized, serial objectors "can make a living simply by filing frivolous appeals and thereby slowing down the execution of settlements" because "[t]he larger the settlement, the more cost-effective it is to pay the objectors rather than suffer the delay of waiting for an appeal to be resolved (even an expedited appeal)." In re Merck & Co. Secs., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., MDL No. 1658 (SRC), 2016 WL 4820620, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016) (granting motion to require serial objector to post appeal bond). Thus, "[t]he fact that the objections are asserted by a serial or 'professional' objector . . . may be relevant in determining

[1] The Court has reviewed of the briefing, heard argument from Class Counsel and from Mr. West of the Bandas Firm, and considered the proposed orders submitted by Class Counsel and the Bandas Firm. In its final approval order, the Court considers and overrules the substance of Ms. Hampe's objection.

the weight to accord the objection, as an objection carries more credibility if asserted to benefit the class and not merely to enrich the objector or her attorney." In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 357 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1104 (D. Kan. 2018) (referring, in part, to a Bandas Firm objection).

The Bandas Firm has a history of filing objections through Christopher Bandas' family members, Ms. and Mr. Hampe.[2] In one of those cases, the court referred to Bandas as "a known vexatious appellant" who has been "repeatedly admonished for pursuing frivolous appeals of objections to class action settlements." In re Gen. Elec. Co. Sec. Litig., 998 F. Supp. 2d 145, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In imposing an appeal bond, the General Electric court also found that Clark Hampe's objections were "frivolous" and "brought in bad faith," emphasizing that "Hampe has a history of vexatious conduct through frivolous settlement objections." Id. at 155. The court cited multiple instances in which Mr. Hampe, with his brother at the Bandas Firm, has filed "objections to other class action settlements and appealed those objections." Id. at 156. While the court did not identify any familial relation between Clark Hampe and Bandas, it ruled "Hampe's relationship with Bandas, a known vexatious appellant, further supports a finding that Mr. Hampe brings this appeal in bad faith." General Electric, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 156.

Christopher Bandas has not directly sought to appear before this Court in this matter, but his employees Mr. Clore and Mr. West have appeared on behalf of Ms. Hampe. Because of his participation in the Bandas Firm's practice of filing objections for improper purposes, Mr. Clore has repeatedly been denied admission pro hac vice. See, e.g., In re Valeant Pharms. Int'l, Inc. Sec.

[2] In addition to General Electric, Clark Hampe's objections with the Bandas Firm include at least In re Nutella Marketing & Sales Practices, No. 11-1086, 2012 WL 6013276, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2012); Kardonick v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 1:10-cv-23235 (WMH) (S.D. Fla. objection filed Aug. 19, 2011 (Doc. #341), notice of appeal filed Oct. 14, 2011 (Doc. 401)); and McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00242 (AB) (E.D. Pa. objection filed June 6, 2011 (Doc. #752), notice of appeal filed Jan. 18, 2012 (Doc. #796)). Cassie Hampe previously objected in Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-00171 JHN (C.D. Cal. notice of appeal filed Nov. 10, 2011 (Doc. #117)). While she appeared pro se in that matter, Ms. Hampe admitted in her deposition in this matter that in Bateman she was represented by the Bandas Firm. (Doc. #208-1), Hampe Depo. 9:12-17.

Litig., No. 15-7658 (MAS)(LHG), 2020 WL 7585741 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2020), reconsideration denied, 2021 WL 3140029 (D.N.J. July 2, 2021). Mr. West, who is now an employee of the Bandas Firm, was himself an objector represented by Mr. Clore, Mr. Bandas, and the Bandas Firm, in the Equifax data breach MDL. There, the court found Bandas to be a serial objector and rejected West's objections as "not in the best interests of the class." Equifax, 2020 WL 256132, at *41 (further finding "that the class would be best served by final resolution of [West's objection] as soon as practicable so that class members can begin to benefit from the settlement.").

This Court need not recount the full history of other courts' grappling with the Bandas Firm's objection practices.[3] However, in one recent example, in Garber v. Office of Comm'r of Baseball, No. 12-CV03704 (VEC), 2017 WL 752183, at *4 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017), the court described Bandas as a "professional" objector who "primarily seek[s] to obstruct or delay settlement proceedings so as to extract attorneys' fees in exchange for the withdrawal of the objection." In overruling the objection, the court noted that it "joins the other courts throughout the country in finding that Bandas has orchestrated the filing of a frivolous objection in an attempt to throw a monkey wrench into the settlement process and to extort a pay-off." Id. at *6. Given the Bandas Firm's long history of similar misconduct, the court went further and ordered Bandas to provide a copy of the court's opinion criticizing his record of frivolous objections to any local counsel he seeks to work with in the Southern District of New York. Id.

In 2018, an Illinois court referred Bandas to the state disciplinary commission, noting that despite "earning condemnation for their antics from courts around the country," the Bandas Firm's "obstructionism continues." Clark v. Gannett Co., 122 N.E.3d 376, 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). Then, after being sued in the Northern District of Illinois for objection conduct in Clark, see Edelson PC

[3] See Robert Klonoff, *Class Action Objectors: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly*, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 475, 490 n.85 (2020) (collecting cases, identifying at least 84 objections through 2020).

v. Bandas Law Firm PC, No. 16 C 11057, 2018 WL 723287, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2018), the Bandas Firm and Christopher Bandas admitted that: (1) they "engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Illinois"; (2) their "unethical, improper, and misleading conduct in filing or causing to be filed objections to proposed class action settlements" made the plaintiffs "entitled to a permanent injunction"; (3) their conduct "placed self-interest and financial considerations above ethical obligations"; (4) their "reputations before the courts of this jurisdiction and across the country have been gravely but justifiably tarnished"; and (5), that, should they "continue to practice class litigation, they will carry the tattoo of these orders with them." Defendants' Motion For Leave To Amend Answer And Withdraw Counterclaim And For Judgment On The Pleadings, Doc. 175 at 2-3, filed Jan. 15, 2019, in Edelson PC v. Bandas Law Firm PC, No. 16-CV-11057 (N.D. Ill.). The Illinois court then entered a permanent injunction barring the Bandas Firm and Christopher Bandas from various activities within Illinois, and from "[s]eeking admission, pro hac vice or otherwise, to practice in any state or federal court without fully and truthfully responding to all questions on the application and without attaching a copy" of the injunction. See Edelson P.C. v. Bandas Law Firm PC, No. 1:16-cv-11057, 2019 WL 272812, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2019) (the "Bandas Injunction").

Shortly after entry of the Bandas Injunction, the firm sought admission in the District of New Jersey. The court there denied the Mr. Bandas' and Mr. Clore's motions for pro hac vice admission after referencing the Bandas Injunction and stating that "several courts around the country have expressed skepticism that Mr. Bandas' objections to class settlements have been made in good faith." Letter Order (Doc. 223), Cole v. NIBCO, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-07871 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2019). The Cole court concluded that, in light of the purpose of the Federal Rules to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding," the "Court is not persuaded that the admission of Messrs. Bandas and Clore will effectuate this aim" and "[a]s a

result, the Court exercises its discretion against permitting their pro hac vice admission." Id. at 3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).

Despite the result in Cole, Mr. Clore again sought admission pro hac vice in the District of New Jersey, a request that was denied because of Clore's affiliation with the Bandas Firm and participation in the firm's objection practices. See Valeant Pharms., 2020 WL 7585741. The Valeant court found "support for the notion that other courts' findings of bad faith by the Bandas Firm can and should be imputed to Clore." Id. at *5 ("Thus, the sins of the firm may be visited on the associate."). The Valeant court concluded that "given the lengthy and extremely troubling history of the Bandas Firm, and the many courts that have recognized its continuing practice of filing objections without sufficient basis, this Court finds that it would be inappropriate to grant the Motion allowing Clore to practice here." Id. Notably, the court found "[i]t is too apparent that the application is part of a pattern that the Bandas Firm has established and which Clore, wittingly or unwittingly, is perpetuating." Id.

B. Findings Regarding the Bandas Firm and the Hampe Objection

In its briefing and proposed order, the Bandas Firm goes to great lengths to deny any involvement by Mr. Bandas in this matter, seeking to distance Mr. Clore and Mr. West from their law firm and its sole principal. As did the court in Valeant and elsewhere, this Court finds that the Bandas Firm's demonstrated history of improper objection practices can and should be imputed to Mr. Clore and Mr. West, and the Bandas Firm's client Ms. Hampe. Though Mr. Clore and Mr. West argue that their firm and Mr. Bandas are irrelevant, Ms. Hampe testified in this case that she is represented by the Bandas Firm, that Christopher Bandas is the principal of the Bandas Firm, and that Mr. Bandas is her brother-in-law. (Doc. #208-1, Hampe Dep., at 7:18-24; 8:23-9:2).[4]

[4] Class Counsel elicited testimony that Ms. Hampe has been married to Christopher Bandas' brother Clark Hampe since 2008, but she had "no idea" that her husband had objected to other class settlements, or that Bandas had represented Clark Hampe in at least four class action objections since 2011. (Doc. 208-1 at

There is no dispute that Ms. Hampe's written representation agreement (Doc. #216-6) is with the Bandas Firm, not Mr. Clore, Mr. West, or their local counsel.[5]

The Bandas Firm argues that the 2018 amendments to Rule 23(e)(5)(b) — requiring that a court approve any payments to objectors or their lawyers made in exchange for withdrawing objections — absolve it of its past conduct and necessarily protect the best interests of the settlement class. (Doc. #216 at 6 ("Most of the allegations against Mr. Bandas, who is not Ms. Hampe's attorney, predate [the 2018 amendments to Rule 23].")); id. at 1-2 ("Otherwise, the fact that the principal of the Bandas Law Firm has been the subject of judicial criticism in the past is an outdated narrative with the amendments to Rule 23."). The Court rejects the Bandas Firm's attempt to insulate itself from the past behind the 2018 amendments.[6] In doing so, the Court gives weight to the Bandas Firm's 2019 admissions leading to the 2019 Bandas Injunction: that it engaged in "unethical, improper, and misleading conduct in filing or causing to be filed objections to proposed class action settlements"; that its conduct "placed self-interest and financial considerations above ethical obligations"; that its "reputations before the courts of this jurisdiction and across the country have been gravely but justifiably tarnished"; and that, should the firm "continue to practice class litigation, they will carry the tattoo of these orders with them." See Defendants' Motion For Leave To Amend Answer And Withdraw Counterclaim And For

11:17-19; 12:10-13:9). Further, Ms. Hampe testified that upon reviewing the notice of settlement, her objection was that the relief provided to her as a long-time T-Mobile customer was not adequate. Id. at 34:2-5. She had not considered objecting to the requested attorneys' fees before sending the notice to the Bandas Firm. Only later did Mr. Clore apparently suggest an objection based on the requested attorneys' fees, which is the only objection raised in Ms. Hampe's objection drafted by the Bandas Firm. Id. at 34:6-8.

[5] Ms. Hampe testified that she had no contact with local counsel until well after her objection was filed. (Doc. #208-1, at 17:15-23; 19:9-18).

[6] The Advisory Committee Note to 2018 Amendment to Rule 23(e)(5)(b) explains the amendments were an attempt to partly correct "a system that can encourage objections advanced for improper purposes."

Judgment On The Pleadings, Doc. 175 at 2-3, filed Jan. 15, 2019, in Edelson PC v. Bandas Law Firm PC, No. 16-CV-11057 (N.D. Ill.).

Further, the Court discounts the Bandas Firm's emphasis on its role in the post-2018 amendments settlement in the Syngenta litigation before Judge Lungstrum in the District of Kansas. There, the Bandas Firm objected to the settlement on the same basis it does here — arguing that the $1.5 billion settlement produced a so called "mega-fund" requiring modification of the application of the Johnson factors. Syngenta, Doc. 3669 at 11-16. The Syngenta court rejected the Bandas Firm's arguments for a reduced fee percentage based on a sliding scale in "mega-fund" settlements, giving those arguments less weight because of the Bandas Firm's history as a serial objector and finding that the Bandas Firm's argument was inconsistent with the Tenth Circuit's endorsement of the Johnson factors. Syngenta, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 1106 (finding the Bandas firm a serial objector and therefore giving the objection somewhat less weight); id. at 1114 (ruling the sliding scale approach "fails to provide the proper incentive for counsel and is fundamentally at odds with the percentage-of-the-fund approach favored by the Tenth Circuit"). Consistent with its longstanding practice, the Bandas Firm then appealed, leveraging a lengthy delay in distributing benefits to the class and ultimately extracting a $900,000 fee in exchange for dismissing the appeal.

The fact that the Bandas Firm conditioned withdrawal of its appeal in Syngenta on approval of its requested $900,000 in attorneys' fees suggests that the Bandas Firm's motive was not securing a benefit for the settlement class but securing a fee award. In re Syngenta MIR 162 Corn Litig., 2:14-md-02591-JWL-JPO, Doc. 4278-1 at § 2.2.5 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2019) (agreement stating that if the district court denied the motion seeking its approval of the joint motion, which included the Bandas Firm's fee request, the parties would request that abatement of the appeals be lifted). If the Bandas Firm's interest was securing additional relief for the settlement class, it could have secured that relief independent of whether the district court agreed to award it attorneys' fees.

The Bandas Firm also fails to acknowledge that in Syngenta its settlement produced "[n]o changes . . . to the Judgment or the Class Action Settlement." Syngenta, Doc. 4278, at 3 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2019) (Jt. Mot. for Indicative Ruling).[7] Moreover, the Court in Syngenta understood the nature of the bargain struck by plaintiffs' counsel, noting the benefit to the class was "accelerating the time frame for payment to the class." Syngenta, Doc. 4318, Jan. 3, 2020 Hr'g Tr. at 10.[8] Thus, if anything, the bargain struck in Syngenta highlights that the Bandas Firm continues to use Rule 23 — despite its amendments — to trade dismissal of an appeal premised on the cost of delay to the settlement class for its own remuneration.

Based on the record, all of the parties' submissions, and the Bandas Firm's patterns of objection practice, the Court finds that the Bandas Firm and Ms. Hampe are "serial" objectors. The Court finds that Ms. Hampe's objection, like others of her husband and the Bandas Firm (whose sole principal is Ms. Hampe's brother-in-law), is vexatious and brought in bad faith. The Court finds that Ms. Hampe's objection was brought by the Bandas Firm for the sole purpose of extracting a fee from the settlement fund.

C. Motion to strike the Hampe Objection is granted

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a court to strike "from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "Judges enjoy liberal discretion to strike pleadings under Rule 12(f)." BJC Health Sys. v.

[7] The Bandas Firm also argues that the Syngenta court found its objection assisted in evaluating the proposed settlement. Syngenta, Doc. 216 at 8. But that does not explain the Bandas Firm's decision to appeal approval of the settlement, using the threat of delaying distribution of payments to Syngenta class members to extract an agreement to support its request for attorneys' fees.

[8] Class Counsel also points to Equifax, where the Bandas Firm made the same "mega-fund" argument (through Mr. West as an objector), which was rejected by the district court. The Bandas Firm appealed, but no pay off was made to drop the appeal. The Bandas Firm lost the appeal, but payments to the class were delayed by 2 years, illustrating the leverage created by such objectors. Equifax, No. 1:17-md-2800, Doc. #982 (Feb. 11, 2020 Notice of Appeal by Mikell West); Doc. #1222 (Jan. 18, 2022 Supreme Court order denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari).

Columbia Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Cent. Mo. Elec. Coop., 278 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 2001)). Though Ms. Hampe's lawyers assert an objection cannot be stricken under Rule 12(f), claiming objections are not "pleadings" within the meaning of Rule 7(a), district courts have exercised their discretionary power to strike objections, which are the only "pleadings" filed by an objector. See, e.g., Byrne v. Santa Barbara Hosp. Servs., Inc., No. EDCV1700527JGBKKX, 2018 WL 10483678, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2018) (striking objection to class settlement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)); Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01L85, 2011 WL 12523823, at *1, *3 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 14, 2011) (striking objection, denying Bandas's motion seeking admission pro hac vice, and finding that "[t]he record before the Court demonstrates that Bandas is a professional objector who is improperly attempting to 'hijack' the settlement of this case from deserving class members and dedicated, hard working counsel, solely to coerce ill-gotten, inappropriate and unspecified 'legal fees'"); In re Hydroxycut Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 09md2087 BTM (KSC), 2013 WL 5275618, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2013) (striking Bandas Firm objection and finding the objection was "filed for the improper purpose of obtaining a cash settlement in exchange for withdrawing the objections," and finding credible testimony that Bandas had demanded $400,000 to "make his objection go away" rather than "hold the settlement process up for two to three years through the appeal process").

It is thus within the Court's discretion to strike an objection that is vexatious and brought in bad faith. The Court, having concluded based on the record and for the reasons set forth above that the objection filed by Ms. Hampe through the Bandas Firm is not made in good faith, strikes the objection. The Court further finds that striking this objection is consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, which requires the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion to strike the objection of Cassie Hampe.

D. Motion to Revoke Admission of Bandas Firms' Lawyers is granted

Two lawyers from the Bandas Firm, Robert W. Clore and Mikell A. West, filed motions for admission pro hac vice to represent Ms. Hampe (Docs. #190, #191). Those motions were granted as a matter of course by the Clerk of Court (Doc. #193). Plaintiffs have moved the Court for an order revoking the admission of Messrs. Clore and West in this case.

While the Clerk of Court routinely accepts compliant applications in its ministerial role, L.R. 83.5(g)(4), admission pro hac vice is a privilege, not a right, and the Court has discretion to reject or revoke pro hac vice status. Matter of Ferguson, 64 B.R. 553, 554-55 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) ("It is well settled that permission to a nonresident attorney, who has not been admitted to practice in a court, to appear pro hac vice is not a right but a privilege, the granting of which is a matter of grace resting in the sound discretion of the presiding judge." (quotation omitted)); In re Valeant, 2020 WL 7585741, at *2 ("Federal courts have wide discretion to deny pro hac vice admission to an attorney based on the applicant's bad faith behavior, even in the absence of formal ethical complaints. It follows that pro hac vice admission is a privilege within the purview of the court.").

The Court finds that the Bandas Firm has forfeited the privilege of pro hac vice admission. In numerous other cases and now here, the Bandas Firm has been found to have brought before courts vexatious and bad faith objections. At least two courts have already denied Mr. Clore the ability to appear on behalf of objectors. In re Valeant, 2020 WL 7585741; Cole, No. 3:13-cv-07871, Doc. 223 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2019). Mr. West has been an objector for the Bandas Firm and Mr. Clore, and West was found not to be acting in the best interests of the settlement class. Equifax, 2020 WL 256132, at *41. Even now, compelled by a permanent injunction entered by a federal court, Clore and West misleadingly certified that they submitted the Bandas Injunction with their motions for admission pro hac vice "out of an abundance of caution," see Doc. #190-1 at 4; Doc.

#191 at 2, knowing that as representatives of the Bandas Firm they were legally obligated to do so pursuant to a permanent injunction. See Edelson PC, 2019 WL 272812, at *1. The Court concludes it is necessary to deny Mr. Clore and Mr. West admission before this Court because the Bandas Firm's participation in this MDL is likely to improperly hinder the settlement process and is antithetical to the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Kohlmayer v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 124 F. Supp. 2d 877, 882 (D.N.J. 2000) (affirming denial of pro hac vice admission and concluding that "[w]hen forewarned with a substantial amount of evidence that an attorney is likely to hinder the litigation process, a court should not and cannot be forced to grant a pro hac vice application of that attorney"). The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion to revoke the admission pro hac vice of Robert Clore and Mikell West. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Objection of Cassie Hampe and to Revoke Admission Pro Hac Vice of Robert Clore and Mikell West (Doc. #208) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to STRIKE from the record the Hampe Objection (Doc. #189) and the pro hac vice admissions of Robert W. Clore (Doc. #190) and Mikell A. West (Doc. #191).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 29, 2023

/s/ Brian C. Wimes
JUDGE BRIAN C. WIMES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT